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Abstract
The purchasing behaviour of consumers is often influenced by numerous factors, including
the visibility of the products and the influence of other customers through their own purchases
or their recommendations.
Motivated by trial-offer and freemium markets and a number of online markets for cultural
products, leisure services, and retail, this paper studies the dynamics of a marketplace ran by
a single firm and which is visited by heterogeneous consumers whose choice preferences can be
modeled using a Mixed Multinomial Logit. In this marketplace, consumers are influenced by
past purchases, the inherent appeal of the products, and the visibility of each product. The
resulting market generalizes recent models already verified in cultural markets.
We examine various marketing policies for this market and analyze their long-term dynamics
and the potential benefits of social influence. In particular, we show that the heterogeneity of
the customers complicates the market significantly: Many of the optimality and computational
properties of the corresponding homogeneous market no longer hold. To remedy these limi-
tations, we explore a market segmentation strategy and quantify its benefits. The theoretical
results are complemented by Monte Carlo simulations conducted on examples of interest.
1 Introduction
The effects of social influence on consumer behaviour have been observed in a wide range of settings
(e.g., [11, 12, 15]). Social influence may appear through different social signals, such as the number
of past purchases, consumer ratings, and consumer recommendations, depending on the market
and/or the marketing platform. However, not all social signals are equally important. Indeed,
two recent studies [3, 15] have been conducted to understand the relative importance of different
social signals on consumer behaviour, one in the Android app platform and the other one in hotel
selection. Both experiments arrived to the same conclusion, namely that the popularity signal
(i.e., the number of purchases) has a much stronger impact on consumer behavior than the average
consumer rating signal.
In addition to the impact of social influence, consumer preferences are also affected in significant
ways by product visibilities. In digital markets, the impact of visibility on consumer behavior
has been widely observed, including in internet advertisement where sophisticated mathematical
models have been developed to determine the relative importance of the various product positions
[2]. Positioning effects are also of high significance in online stores such as Expedia, Amazon, and
iTunes, as well as physical retail stores (see, e.g., [6]).
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Figure 1: Rankings Averaging Scores of a Consumer Segment at Booking.com.
There are at least three key managerial decisions that naturally arise in markets with social
influence and visibility:
1. How to assign products to the available positions?
2. How should social influence be used? Is it beneficial at all?
3. What are the benefits of market segmentation?
All these decisions may have a fundamental impact on market efficiency and predictability. The first
type of decisions ponders how to rank the products and studies whether popularity or a concept of
quality should drive the assignment of products to positions. The second type of decisions analyzes
which social influence signal (e.g., popularity signals versus ratings) is beneficial (if any). Finally,
the third type of decisions analyzes the benefits of presenting different information to different
customers. This is particularly significant in online markets where rich information may have been
gathered on an arriving customer and its relationship with others. For example, a recent analysis
performed by the online travel agent Orbitz has shown that Mac users spend up to about 30%
more in hotel bookings than their PC counterparts [7]. As a consequence, it is beneficial to show
different rankings to customers depending on the computer they use.
Of course, these decisions do not take place in isolation. For instance, it is valuable to study
how to combine social influence and market segmentation in order to determine which signal (if
any) should be used for different segmentation strategies. While most online platforms display
social signals about all past consumers, the major online travel agent Booking.com allows users
to rank hotels according to the average consumers score of a particular segment such as couples,
families, and solo travelers. See Figure 1 for an illustration of this feature.
The purpose of this paper is to address these questions by studying the dynamics of a mar-
ketplace ran by a single firm and where the choice preferences of its heterogeneous consumers are
modeled using a Mixed Multinomial Logit. In this marketplace, consumers are influenced by the
past purchases, as well as by the inherent appeal of the products and how visible each product is
in the marketplace. Our approach applies to multiple settings such as those arising in music and
film online markets and trial-offer and freemium markets. It also generalizes recent models already
verified in cultural markets.
Our work is related to the MusicLab experiment performed by Salganik et al. [11]. In that
experiment, participants were presented a list of unknown songs from unknown bands, each song
being described by its name and band. The participants were partitioned into two groups exposed to
two different experimental conditions: the independent condition and the social influence condition.
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In the independent group, participants were shown the songs in a random order and they were
allowed to listen to each of them and then download them if they wish. In the second group (social
influence condition), participants were shown the songs in popularity order, i.e., allocating the most
popular songs to the most visible positions. Moreover, these participants were also shown a social
signal, i.e., the number of times each song was downloaded too. In order to investigate the impact
of social influence, participants in the second group were distributed in eight “worlds” evolving
completely independently. In particular, participants in one world had no visibility about the
downloads and the rankings in the other worlds. The MusicLab is an ideal experimental example
of a trial-offer market where each song represents a product, and listening and downloading a song
represent trying and purchasing a product respectively. The results by Salganik et al. [11] show
that the different worlds evolve significantly differently from one another, providing evidence that
social influence may introduce unpredictability in a market.
To explain these results, Krumme et al. [4] proposed a framework in which consumer choices
are captured by a multinomial logit model whose product utilities depend on songs appeal, position
bias, and social influence. Abeliuk et al. [1] provided a theoretical and experimental analysis of
such trial-offer markets using different ranking policies following the framework of Krumme et al.
[4]. They proved that social influence is beneficial in order to maximize the expected number of
downloads when using a greedy heuristic known as performance ranking. In performance ranking
selects greedily the ranking that maximizes the expected number of downloads at the next time
period, i.e. it maximizes the short-term market efficiency. Abeliuk et al. [1] have also illustrated
experimentally that the popularity ranking is outperformed by the performance ranking in a variety
of settings. Still based on the model of Krumme et al. [4], Van Hentenryck et al. [13] have studied the
performance of the quality ranking which ranks products by their intrinsic quality ∗: They show that
the quality ranking is in fact asymptotically optimal and has a considerably less unpredictability
than the popularity ranking.
The main shortcoming of the models employed in [4, 1, 13] is the assumption that consumers
are homogeneous: The product qualities and appeals are the same for all consumers. Given that
current technology makes it possible for a website to obtain user information (including computer
type), online firms may use this information to prioritize differently the product assortments for
each incoming customer. Moreover, these firms may also decide to incorporate information about
the past purchases of a specific consumer class as a social signal. For example, instead of displaying
the total number of bookings for each hotel, the firm may only display the number of bookings by
similar consumers (e.g., in age or income bracket). Pursuing such segmentation strategies has an
associated cost as it requires to gather consumer information and to analyze it correctly. It is thus
important to understand their potential benefits and to go beyond the models in [4, 1, 13].
In this paper, we remedy this limitation and study the dynamics of trial-offer markets with
social influence and where consumers have heterogeneous preferences. More specifically, consumer
preferences are modeled with a mixed multinomial logit [8]. Our main findings provide quantitative
insights about the benefits of market segmentation in online markets and can be summarized as
follows.
1. We first show that Computing the (optimal) performance ranking in a mixed multinomial
logit model is NP-Hard under Turing reductions, indicating that moving from an homoge-
neous setting (MNL) to an heterogeneous setting (Mixed MNL) has significant computational
∗the quality of a product is here defined as the probability that a consumer would purchase/download the product
once she has tried the product out
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implications.
2. We then study a policy, the average quality ranking, which orders the items in decreasing
order of average quality. We show that the average quality ranking converges to a unique
equilibrium when consumers are shown the number of past purchases (the popularity signal).
Unfortunately, we also show that the popularity signal may, perhaps surprisingly, decrease
the expected market efficiency of the average quality ranking.
3. We consider a simple segmentation strategy, where customers are shown a quality ranking
dedicated to their class and only observe the popularity signal for their own market segment
(i.e., the past purchases of customers of the same class. We show that this segmented quality
ranking always outperforms, asymptotically and in expectation, the average quality ranking
and may improve the market efficiency by a factor K, where K is the number of classes.
These theoretical results are complemented by an agent-based simulation performed on a number of
settings. The simulation results highlight every theoretical results, suggesting that the segmented
quality ranking with a popularity signal is an interesting avenue for trial-offer markets.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model of the
dynamic trial-offer market. The most relevant ranking policies for this model are described in Sec-
tion 3, which also presents the NP-hardness results for performance ranking in mixed multinomial
logit models. Section 4 describes the convergence and the impact of social influence for the quality
ranking in the same setting. Section 5 presents our segmentation strategy and its benefits. Section
6 presents the results of the agent-based simulation and Section 7 concludes the paper. The proofs
not given in the text are in the appendix.
2 The Model
Motivation We consider a firm running a marketplace that sells a set of products. Following
[4, 11], we focus our attention to trial-offer markets, i.e., markets in which consumers can try the
product for free before deciding to make a purchase. Consumers are position-biased in the following
sense: The likelihood of trying a specific product is affected by the position of the product, as well
as the position of the others products in the market. There is large experimental evidence for this
type of bias in digital markets [9], as well as in traditional retailing [14]. It is therefore important
for the firm to decide how to allocate products to locations since this affects the market efficiency,
i.e., the total number of purchases. We also consider a marketplace where it is possible to display
information about product popularity. In particular, we assume that the firm shows the total
number of purchases for each item at each point in time. While there is considerable evidence
and consensus among the researchers that the display of information about consumer preferences
changes consumer behaviour, it remains a matter of discussion whether such display may benefit
consumers and the market,
Unlike [4], we consider that there are different classes of consumers, meaning that the probability
that a consumer would try a given item depends on the consumer class. Our model for consumer
behaviour is therefore far more general than in [4]. Moreover, the probability that a given consumer
tries an item will follow a Mixed Multinomial Logit (MMNL). Since McFadden and Train [8] proved
that every random utility model can be well approximated by a MMNL, our model of consumer
preferences is indeed very general.
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Formalization We now formally describe a dynamic model for this marketplace. Let [N ] =
{1, 2, . . . , N} denote the set of items in the marketplace and SN denote the set of the permutations
of these items. At any point in time, the firm decides how to position the items in the market
by selecting a permutation σ ∈ SN such that σ(i) = j implies that item i is placed in position j
(j ∈ [N ]).
The consumer behaviour can be described as follows. There are K different classes of consumers.
The rate of consumers from class k arriving in any given time interval of unitary length follows a
Poisson process with a mean value λk. The weight wi of each class i is then defined as
wi =
λi∑n
i=1 λi
.
When consumer t enters the market, she observes all the items and a popularity vector dt =
(dt1, d
t
2, . . . , d
t
N ) ∈ NN , where dti is the number of times item i has been bought for prior to her
arrival at time t. When the consumer arrives, each of the N items have been given a position
through a permutation σ ∈ SN . The consumer selects an item to try and then decides whether to
buy it. If the consumer belongs to class k, the probability that she tries item i is given by
pi,k(σ, d
t) =
vσ(i)(ai,k + d
t
i)∑n
j=1 vσ(j)(aj,k + d
t
j) + z
(1)
where z ∈ R≥0 is fixed to a constant for the duration of the process, vj ∈ R≥0 represents the
visibility of position j ∈ [N ] regardless of the consumer class (the higher the value vj the more
visible the item in that position is), and ai,k ∈ R>0 captures the intrinsic appeal of item i for
consumer class k for all i ∈ [N ] (higher values correspond to more appealing items).
If a consumer from class k has selected item i for a trial, the probability that she would
purchase the item is given by qi,k ∈ [0, 1]. Observe that this probability is independent of both the
appeal vector (a1,k, . . . , aN,k) and the visibility vector v. Intuitively, this assumption, which has
been validated in the MusicLab experiment, captures the fact that it is more difficult to influence
consumers after they have tested a product than before.
When the consumer decides to purchase item i, the popularity/sales vector d is increased by
one in position i. To analyze this process, we divide time into discrete periods such that each new
period begins when a new consumer arrives. Hence, the length of each time period is not constant.
The objective of the firm running this market is to maximize the total expected number of
purchases. To achieve this, the key managerial decision of the firm is what is known as the ranking
policy [1], which consists in deciding at each point in time the permutation σ ∈ SN to display the
items. The next section describes a number of relevant ranking policies for this model.
A key aspect of this paper is to study the potential benefits of the popularity signal on market
efficiency and compare the ranking policies with and without this signal. In this paper, we always
assume that the popularity signal is used as specified in Equation (1). When the popularity signal
is not used, the probability of sampling a product is given by assuming that the popularity signal
is simply the vector 〈0, . . . , 0〉.
3 Ranking Policies
Consider without loss of generality that the N locations are sorted by their visibility such that
v1 ≥ v2 ≥ . . . ≥ vN . A ranking policy is a function f : NN → SN which, given a vector of past
purchases, returns a ranking of the items.
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Ranking policies can be partitioned into two groups: static and dynamic. A ranking policy g is
said to be static if the output ranking does not depend on the popularity signal, i.e., if g(d) = g(d′)
for all d, d′ ∈ NN . On the other hand, a dynamic ranking policy is one in which the output ranking
depends on this signal.
A widely used dynamic policy consists in ranking the items according to their current popularity:
Select σ ∈ SN such that σ(x) = i if item x is currently the ith most purchased product at this
point. This policy is called the popularity ranking and is widely used. Abeliuk et al. [1] have shown
that this ranking policy does not maximize the expected number of purchases in the special case
where K = 1.
Another dynamic ranking strategy, known as activity ranking, was studied in an experiment by
Lerman and Hogg [5]. In activity ranking, products are sorted in chronological order of the last
purchased time, i.e., the item last purchased appears first, while the item least recently purchased
appears last. In their experiment conducted with individuals recruited with the Mechanical Turk,
Lerman and Hogg [5] have observed that activity ranking improves consumer recommendations
with respect to popularity ranking.
The performance ranking is a dynamic policy that greedily selects a ranking that maximizes
the expected number of purchases in the following period. This strategy was first proposed by
Abeliuk et al. [1] for the special case with K = 1 and we now generalize its definition for the more
general model considered in this paper. Given the memory-less nature of the Poisson distribution,
the probability that the next incoming consumer belongs to class k is given by
wk =
λk∑K
k=1 λk
.
Therefore the performance ranking at time period t consists of finding the permutation σ∗ ∈ SN
maximizing the probability of a purchase in the next time period, i.e.,
σ∗ = argmax
σ∈Sn
K∑
k=1
wk ·
N∑
i=1
pi,k(σ, d
t) · qi,k. (2)
The probability ΠPR of a purchase in the next time period is thus given by
ΠPR = max
σ∈Sn
{ K∑
k=1
(
wk ·
N∑
i=1
(pi,k(σ, d
t) · qi,k)
)}
(3)
= max
σ∈Sn
{ K∑
k=1
(
wk ·
N∑
i=1
( vσ(i)(ai,k + dti)∑N
j=1 vσ(j)(aj,k + d
t
j)
· qi,k
))}
. (4)
Abeliuk et al. [1] showed that the performance ranking can be computed efficiently, i.e., in strongly
polynomial time: See Theorem 1 by Abeliuk et al. [1].† Moreover, despite the myopic focus of the
performance ranking, a series of agent-based simulations performed by Abeliuk et al. [1] showed
that, for the special case of K = 1, the performance ranking outperforms the popularity ranking
by roughly 20 percent in the long run on experiments modeled after the MusicLab, and exhibits
much less unpredictability. Unfortunately, the performance ranking cannot be computed efficiently
when there are at least two classes of consumers. More precisely, we can show that the 2-Class
Logit problem which is known to be NP-hard [10] can be reduced (under Turing reductions) to
computing the performance ranking in our setting.
†Abeliuk et al. [1] assumed z = 0 but their proof can be easily generalized for any z ∈ R≥0.
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Theorem 1. Computing the performance ranking is NP-hard under Turing reductions. This is
true even when K = 2 and the product qualities are the same for all consumer classes.
Finally, the quality ranking is a simple and natural static policy studied by Van Hentenryck
et al. [13] for the case K = 1: It simply consists in ranking the products by quality, ignoring the
appeals and popularity signal. The quality ranking can easily be generalized to K classes by taking
the weighted average of the class qualities. The quality ranking for the MMNL model thus consists
in placing in position j the item with the jth highest weighted average quality, where the weighted
average quality of item i ∈ [N ] is
q¯i =
K∑
k=1
wkqi,k. (5)
For the special case K = 1, Van Hentenryck et al. [13] proved that the quality ranking is optimal
asymptotically and always benefits from the popularity signal used in our model. The next section
will study whether this continues to hold K > 1. Note that, in the following, the ranking which
orders the products by decreasing values of q¯i is called the average quality ranking.
4 Properties of Average Quality Ranking
This section studies the properties of the average quality ranking for the MMNL model. We first
show that the average quality ranking converges to a monopoly (under weak conditions). We then
study the benefits of popularity signal for the average quality ranking.
4.1 Convergence to a Monopoly
Given a ranking policy f , the random variable
φti =
dti∑
j d
t
j
is known as the market share of item i at time t: It represents the ratio between the number of
times that item i was purchased and the total number of purchases at time t.
Definition 1. The MMNL model goes to a monopoly using a ranking policy f if, for each realization
of the N random sequences {φti}t∈N (i ∈ [N ]), there exists a product i∗ such that the realized
sequence {φi∗t}t∈N converges to 1 as t goes to infinity. In this case, we also say that item i∗ goes
(predictably) to a monopoly.
We can now show that the MMNL model goes to a monopoly when using the average quality
ranking. The proof is quite technical: Its key idea is to show that the Mixed Multinomial Logic
Model (MMNL) can be reduced to a generalized case of the Multinomial Logic Model (MNL) where
the appeal and the quality of an item at time t depend on the popularity signal at t. The proof
relies on the following lemma that generalizes the convergence result of the quality ranking for the
MNL model by Van Hentenryck et al. [13] to the case where the appeal and quality of an item
depend on the popularity ranking provided that that the resulting functions are bounded by above
and below.
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Lemma 1. Consider a Multinomial Logic Model, i.e., a setting with K = 1 where the appeal and
quality of each item i are functions of the purchases vector dt, i.e., a˜ti = a˜i(d
t) and q˜ti = q˜i(d
t)
respectively. Suppose that there exists a time period t∗ such that these two quantities are upper
and lower bounded by constants for any period t > t∗ independent of the realizations of a˜ti and q˜
t
i ,
i.e.,
qi,min ≤ q˜ti ≤ qi,max and ai,min ≤ a˜ti ≤ ai,max ∀i ∈ [N ], t > t∗.
Let σ ∈ SN denote a static ranking policy. If there exists an item i∗ and an instant tˆ such that
vσ(i∗)qi∗,min > vσ(i)qi,max ∀ i 6= i∗ and ∀ t > tˆ,
then item i∗ goes to a monopoly when using the ranking policy σ.
The main result of this section is about the convergence to a monopoly of a large class of static
ranking policies. For simplicity, we assume a weak condition to break potential ties between items.
Definition 2. A static ranking policy σ is tie-breaking for a MMNL model if there exists a unique
item i∗ with the highest product of visibility and weighted average quality, i.e.,
∃ i∗ ∈ [N ] : q¯i∗vσ(i∗) > q¯ivσ(i) ∀i ∈ [N ], i 6= i∗. (6)
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 2. Consider a MMNL model M and a static, tie-breaking ranking policy σ ∈ SN for M.
Model M goes to a monopoly using σ and the item i∗ that goes predictably to a monopoly using σ
in M is given by
i∗ = argmax
1≤i≤N
vσ(i)q¯i.
The following corollary asserts that the average quality ranking converges to a monopoly for the
product of highest average quality. This result is particularly interesting since it shows that the
average quality ranking generalizes the quality ranking from the MNL to the MMNL model.
Corollary 1. (Predictability of Average Quality Ranking). Whenever the quality ranking is used,
a MMNL model goes to a monopoly for the product with the highest weighted average quality.
4.2 The Impact of the Popularity Signal
The previous subsection has shown that the average quality ranking for the MMNL model inherits
the asymptotic convergence of the quality ranking for the MNL. Van Hentenryck et al. [13] have
also shown that The quality ranking always benefits in expectation from the popularity signal in
the MNL model. Unfortunately, this result does not hold for the average quality ranking in the
MMNL model in general. The proof uses the simple matrix inequality:
m∑
j=1
max
1≤i≤n
ai,j ≤ m max
1≤i≤n
m∑
j=1
ai,j . (7)
Theorem 3. When using the average quality ranking, the MMNL model can perform up to K times
better without showing the popularity signal, where K is the number of classes.
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Proof. At the limit, the probability that an item is purchased under the average quality ranking
with the popularity signal is given by
PAQGSI = max
1≤i≤N
q¯i. (8)
When no popularity signal is shown, this probability becomes
PAQNSI =
K∑
k=1
wk
N∑
i=1
qi,k
vσ(i)ai,k∑N
j=1 vσ(j)aj,k + z
. (9)
We can easily bound PAQNSI as follows:
0 ≤
K∑
k=1
min
1≤i≤N
(wkqi,k)
∑N
i=1 vσ(i)ai,k∑N
j=1 vσ(j)aj,k + z
≤ PAQNSI ≤
K∑
k=1
max
1≤i≤N
(wkqi,k) (10)
and hence, by inequality (7),
0 ≤ PAQNSI
PAQGSI
≤ K. (11)
Proposition 1. The bounds in Theorem 3 are tight.
Proof. Consider first the upper bound. Choose a MMNL model where z = 0, K = N , the quality
matrix is diagonal with a value of 1 for the first element and 1−  for all others, the appeal matrix
is the identity, and the classes have the same weights wi =
1
K . Then,
PAQNSI =
∑
1≤i≤N
1
K
(1− (1− δi1)) and
PAQGSI =
1
K
.
and
lim
→0
PAQNSI
PAQGSI
= lim
→0
∑
1≤i≤N
(1− δi1) = lim
→0
(K − (K − 1)) = K. (12)
Consider now the lower bound. Choose a MMNL model where z = 0, K = N with the same quality
matrix as before, the same weights, and an appeal matrix filled with ones except in its diagonal
where each element has a value of A. Then,
PAQNSI =
∑
1≤i≤N
1
K
(1− (1− δi1))
vσ(i)A
Avσ(i) +
∑
j 6=i vσ(j)
PAQGSI =
1
K
.
and
lim
A→0
PAQNSI
PAQGSI
= lim
A→0
∑
1≤i≤N
(1− (1− δi1))
vσ(i)A
Avσ(i) +
∑
j 6=i vσ(j)
= 0. (13)
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The result shows that, in the worst case, using the popularity signal decreases the number of
purchases by the average quality ranking by a factor of K. The direct consequence of these results
is the lack of clarity about the benefits of the popularity signal in MMNL models. The popularity
signal may be beneficial to the average quality ranking but it may also significantly degrade the
performance of the market. This is in contrast with the MNL model where the quality ranking
always benefits from the popularity signal (in expectation). As a result, having a heterogeneous
set of customers complicates, once again, the managerial decisions in the marketplace.
5 Market Segmentation and its Benefits
In the previous sections, we have shown a number of negative results for the MMNL model. In
particular, we have shown that, in MMNL models, computing the performance ranking is intractable
when K > 1 and that displaying the popularity signal to customers may significantly reduce the
asymptotic market efficiency of the average quality ranking. In this section, we show that the
widely used marketing strategy known as market segmentation remedies these limitations, while
retaining the original benefits of quality ranking for the Multinomial Logit Model.
The market segmentation considered here assumes that the firm has the ability to know the
class of each arriving consumer. This is a natural assumption in a number of online markets (e.g.,
Amazon, online retail stores, ITunes, and Netflix) where firms are able to learn information about
their customers over time. Armed with this information, the firm will now propose item rankings
dedicated to each customer class. Moreover, and equally important, the popularity signal will be
tailored to each class. In other words, the firm will only show the popularity signal derived from
purchases of customers of the same class as the incoming customer, not the popularity obtained
from the entire customer pool. As shown in Figure 1, websites such as Booking.com already give
customers the option of selecting their peer groups to refine the site recommendations. Under this
new strategy where each class of consumers has its own quality ranking and observes the past
purchases of its own class only, the policy is called the segmented quality ranking. The firm uses
K permutations σk ∈ SN (k ∈ [K]), where σk sorts the products in decreasing order according to
their quality for class k. In addition, the probability of sampling item i for a customer of class k is
given by
pi,k(σ, d
t
k)
where dtk = (d
t
1,k, . . . , d
t
N,k) and d
t
i,k denotes the number of purchases of item i by customers from
class k up to time t.
We now study the benefits of this market segmentation. Observe first that each market segment
can be viewed as evolving independently and hence directly inherits the original benefits identified
by Van Hentenryck et al. [13] for the quality ranking: It is asymptotically optimal and predictably
goes to a monopoly. This observation will enable us to prove the benefits of market segmentation.
Definition 3. The segmented quality ranking policy σk ∈ SN (k ∈ [K]) is tie-breaking if, for each
class k, there exists a unique item i∗k with the highest quality:
∀k ∈ [K] ∃i∗k ∈ [N ] ∀j ∈ [N ], j 6= i∗k : qi∗k,k > qj,k. (14)
Assuming a MMNL model for which the average quality ranking and the segmented quality ranking
are tie-breaking, we compare the probability of a purchase at time t in both settings. More precisely,
we compare two quantities:
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• P tAQGSI : the probability of a purchase at time t when the firm uses the average quality ranking
and the “global” popularity signal dt;
• P tSQSSI : the probability of a purchase at time t when the firm uses the segmented quality
ranking with the class popularity signal dtk.
The probabilities P tAQGSI and P
t
SQSSI concern the behaviour of the consumer arriving to the market
at time t independently from the customer class. Comparing P tAQGSI and P
t
SQSSI for any time t is
a very challenging task. Instead, we compare both variables in the limit.
Theorem 4. Assume that the average quality ranking and its segmented version are tie-breaking
for a MMNL model. Then,
1 ≤ lim
t→∞
P tSQSSI
P tAQGSI
≤ K. (15)
Proof. By Theorem 2, we have
PAQGSI
.
= lim
t→∞P
t
AQGSI = max{q¯1, q¯2, . . . , q¯N}.
As mentioned earlier, for the segmented quality ranking, each class is independent from each other
and all of them will converge to a monopoly for the product with the highest quality in that class.
We have that
PSQSSI
.
= lim
t→∞P
t
SQSSI =
K∑
k=1
wk max
i
qi,k.
As a result,
PSQSSI
PAQGSI
=
∑K
k=1wk max1≤i≤N qi,k
max1≤i≤N
∑K
k=1wkqi,k
=
∑K
k=1 max1≤i≤N wkqi,k
max1≤i≤N
∑K
k=1wkqi,k
.
The lower bound is obviously valid and the upper bound follows from inequality (7).
Proposition 2. The upper bound of Theorem 4 is tight.
Proof. Consider a model with K items and K consumer classes. Without loss of generality, let the
class 1 be the class with the lowest weight, i.e., w1 ≤ wk∀k ∈ [K]. Then, for any set of positive
appeals in each class, define the elements qi,k as follows:
qi,k =

minj∈[K] wj
w1
if i = k = 1
minj∈[K] wj
wk
−  if i = k 6= 1
0 otherwise
where  is a positive number ensuring that the model is tie-breaking for the quality rankings. Then
lim
→0
PSQSSI
PAQGSI
= lim
A→0
K minj∈[K]wj − 
∑K
k=2wk
minj∈[K]wj
= K.
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These results show that the segmented quality ranking always outperforms the average quality
ranking in expectation and that the improvement in market efficiency can be up to a factor of K.
Note that the segmented quality ranking is optimal asymptotically, since the market segment are
operating independently and each are optimal asymptotically. It does not necessarily mean that
the segmented quality ranking is always better, since the popularity signal is weaker early in the
market evolution. This will be illustrated in the agent-based simulations presented in the next
section.
6 Agent-Based Simulation
This section presents the results of an agent-based simulation to illustrate the theoretical results
and complement them by depicting how the markets evolve over time for different types of rankings.
6.1 The Experimental Setting
The Agent-Based Simulation The experimental setting uses an agent-based simulation to
emulate the MusicLab [11]. It generalizes prior results which simulated the MusicLab through the
use of a MNL model (e.g., [4, 1]) to a MMNL model. Each simulation consists of N iterations and,
at each iteration t (1 ≤ t ≤ N), the simulator
1. randomly selects a customer class k according to the classes weights wk;
2. randomly selects an item i for the incoming customer according to the probabilities pi,k(σ, d),
where σ is the ranking proposed by the policy under evaluation and d is the popularity signal;
3. randomly determines, with probability qk,i, whether selected item i is downloaded. In the case
of a download, the simulator increases the popularity signal for item i, i.e., di,t+1 = di,t + 1.
Otherwise, di,t+1 = di,t.
The experimental setting aims at being close to the MusicLab experiments and it considers 50 items
and simulations with 20, 000 steps. The reported results in the graphs are the average of 1,000,000
simulations.
Qualities and Appeals To highlight and complement the theoretical results, we consider four
different schemes, The schemes share the following characteristics: They have two customer classes
with the same weight and they use 50 products. They differ in how the values for the item appeals
and qualities are chosen. The schemes are depicted visually in Figures 2 and 3 and were obtained
as follows:
1. Scheme 1: The product qualities for each class were chosen uniformly at random 1(q1 and q2
are independent). Appeals were negatively correlated with quality, i.e., ai,k = 1− qi,k.
2. Scheme 2: Product qualities are similar to Scheme 1. Appeal vectors are now correlated
with the quality vectors. More precisely, the appeal vector for each class was set to 0.8
times the quality plus a random uniform vector between -0.4 and 0.4, i.e., ai,k = qi,k(0.8 +
0.4 rand(1, 50)).
3. Scheme 3: The product quality for class 1 is a random vector, while qi,2 = 1 − qi,1 + 0.01 ∗
rand(1, 50). Appeals are negatively correlated with quality, i.e., ai,k = 1− qi,k.
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Figure 2: The Quality qi (blue) and Appeal Ai (green and yellow) of product i for settings 1 and 2
for both classes of consumers. The settings only differ in the appeal of items, and not in the quality
of items. In Setting 1, the appeals are negatively correlated with quality, so that the sum between
them is always 1. In Setting 2, the appeal is correlated to the quality with a small noise.
4. Scheme 4: The product qualities are the same as in Scheme 3 but the appeals are correlated
with qualities, ai,k = qi,k(0.8 + 0.4 rand(1, 50)).
Observe that, in Schemes 3 and 4, customers in the two classes associate fundamentally different
qualities with the products.
The Policies The simulations compare the average and segmented quality rankings with and
without the popularity signal. We use the following notations:
• SQSSI: Segmented quality ranking with segmented popularity signal;
• SQNSI: Segmented quality ranking without popularity signal;
• AQGSI: Average quality ranking with “global” popularity signal;
• AQNSI: Average quality ranking without popularity signal.
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Figure 3: The Quality qi (blue) and Appeal Ai (green and yellow) of product i in settings 3 and 4
for both classes of consumers. The settings only differ in the appeal of items, and not in the quality
of items. In Setting 3, the appeals are negatively correlated with quality, so that the sum between
them is always 1. In Setting 4, the appeal is correlated to the quality with a small noise.
6.2 Market Efficiency
Figure 4 depicts the results for Schemes 1 and 2. For Scheme 1, the popularity signal is beneficial
for both the segmented and average quality rankings. SQSSI is the most efficient ranking policy.
Interestingly, without the popularity signal, the segmentation policy (i.e., the SQNSI policy) per-
forms the worst. Scheme 2 exhibits similar results but the benefits of popularity signal is extremely
significant. It is also interesting to observe that AQGSI outperforms SQSSI early on before being
overtaken as highlighted in Figure 5.
Figure 6 depicts the results for Schemes 3 and 4 and they are particularly interesting. Recall
that, in Schemes 3 and 4, the two classes of customers associate opposite qualities to items. For
Scheme 3, SQSSI is again the best ranking policy but the second best policy is AQNSI, the average
quality ranking with no popularity signal. The worst policy is AQGSI, providing a compelling
illustration of Theorem 3: The popularity signal may be detrimental to the average quality ranking.
For Scheme 4, the popularity signal is again beneficial for the segmented and average quality
rankings. SQSSI is almost twice as efficient than AQGSI, nicely illustrating Theorem 15, since the
improvement is close to the best possible ratio. Once again, SQNSI performs the worst.
These results can be summarized as follows:
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Figure 4: The Number of Purchases over Time for the Various Rankings. The x-axis represents
the number of item samplings and the y-axis represents the average number of purchases over all
experiments. The left figure depicts the results for Scheme 1 and the right figure for Scheme 2.
1. SQSSI (segmentation with the popularity signal) is clearly the best policy and it dominates
all other policies. Market segmentation with the popularity signal is very effective in these
trial-offer markets.
2. SQNSI (segmentation with no popularity signal) is almost always the worst policy and is
dominated by AQNSI (average quality with no popularity signal). In these trial-offer settings,
segmentation with no popularity signal is not an effective policy.
3. The popularity signal may be beneficial or detrimental to the average quality ranking. It is
detrimental when the market has customers are from two classes with opposite tastes.
6.3 Purchase Profiles
We now illustrate the customer and market behaviors for the SQSSI and AGGSI rankings, which
exhibit some significant differences. For Scheme 3, the results are presented in Figures 7, 8, and
9. Figure 7 depicts the purchase profiles of customers of Classes 1 and 2 for policy SQSSI. The
products are sorted by increasing quality for each class: i.e., the products of highest quality for
customers of class 1 (resp. class 2) is in the rightmost position in the left (resp. right) picture.
Since the market is segmented, the results are not surprising and consistent with past results: The
number of purchases is strongly correlated with quality. Figure 8 is more interesting and depicts
the same information for policy AQGSI. Here the number of purchases is no longer correlated with
quality for a specific customer class. Figure 9 compares SQSSI and AQGSI over all customers and
the products are sorted by average quality. The figure highlights a fundamental difference in market
behavior between the two policies, with very different products emerging as the “best sellers”.
Schemes 3 and 4 feature customer classes with opposite tastes. It is thus interesting to re-
port the results on Scheme 1 where the tastes (qualities) were generated independently for the
two classes. Figure 10 depicts these results. We already know from Figure 4 that policy SQSSI
outperforms AQGSI but it is interesting to see how different the market behaves under these two
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Figure 5: The Number of Purchases over Time for the Various Rankings. The x-axis represents
the number of item samplings and the y-axis represents the average number of purchases over all
experiments. The figure depicts the results for Scheme 2 in the early part of the simulation.
policies. For AQGSI, as expected, the products of best average quality receives the most purchases:
Asymptotically the market goes to a monopoly for that product. For SQSSI, the purchases at this
stage of the market are distributed through a larger number of products, each of which have fewer
purchases. Asymptotically, the market will go to a monopoly for two products (one for class 1
and one for class 2) but the popularity signal is weaker for SQSSI since it is spread across the two
classes. It is interesting to observe that the segmentation policy SQSSI is still more efficient than
policy AGGSI despite this weaker popularity signal. Figure 11 depicts the profiles for policy SQSSI
and nicely highlights that many products are receiving significant purchases.
7 Conclusion
This paper considered a trial-offer market with social influence and position bias, where customers
follow a mixed multinomial logit model (MMNL). It proved that, for such a market, finding the
best ranking at every step is a computationally hard problem.
The paper then studied the performance of a ranking policy (AQGSI) based on average product
qualities. The paper proved that the trial-offer market converges predictably to a monopoly by
transforming the MMNL model into a traditional MNL model whose appeals and qualities depends
on the popularity signal at each time step but are bounded from below and above. Unfortunately,
this average quality ranking1 is no longer guaranteed to benefit from the popularity signal in all
cases.
The paper also studied a market segmentation policy which produces a different quality ranking
for each class of customers and uses a popularity signal aggregating only customers in the specific
segment. The resulting policy (SQSSI) is optimal asymptotically in expectation and may improve
the market efficiency by a factor K over AQGSI, where K is the number of customer classes.
Agent-based simulation results have been presented to illustrate the theoretical results. They
present settings in which the popularity signal is indeed detrimental to policy AQGSI and in which
SQSSI improves AQGSI by a factor of about 2 with two classes. They also highlight that SQSSI
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Figure 6: The Number of Purchases over Time for the Various Rankings. The x-axis represents
the number of item samplings and the y-axis represents the average number of purchases over all
experiments. The left figure depicts the results for Scheme 3 and the right figure for Scheme 4.
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Figure 7: The Purchase Profiles of SQSSI on Scheme 3 for Class 1 (left) and Class 2 (right).
outperforms all other policies in these settings, complementing the fact that it is asymptotically
optimal. Moreover, they highlight the fact that AQGSI and SQSSI produce very different market
behavior, even in settings where the overall market efficiency is relatively close.
These results seem to indicate that a market segmentation policy, together with a popularity
signal and position bias, is an interesting avenue to make markets more efficient, both for the
market place and the customers.
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Figure 8: The Purchase Profiles of AQGSI on Scheme 3 for Class 1 (left) and Class 2 (right).
Quality
mean
0.5 0.501 0.502 0.503 0.504 0.505
Pu
rc
ha
se
s
101
102
103
104
105
Scheme 3 - SQSSI
Quality
mean
0.5 0.501 0.502 0.503 0.504 0.505
Pu
rc
ha
se
s
101
102
103
104
105
Scheme 3 - AQGSI
Figure 9: The Purchase Profiles of SQSSI and AQGSI on Scheme 3 for both Classes of Customers.
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Figure 10: The Purchase Profiles of SQSSI and AQGSI on Scheme 1 for both Classes of Customers.
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Figure 11: The Purchase Profiles of SQSSI on Scheme 1 for Class 1 (left) and Class 2 (right).
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Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof uses the 2-Class Logit problem which is known to be NP-hard [10].
The inputs to a 2-Class Logit instance are N products, two sequences V 1 = (V 11 , V
1
2 , . . . , V
1
N ) and
V 2 = (V 21 , V
2
2 , . . . , V
2
N ) with V
1, V 2 ∈ QN+ , and a number α ∈ R[0,1]. Each product i has a revenue
ri ∈ Z+. Each sequence V i represents a realization of the product utilities under a multinomial
logit model. Sequence V 1 (resp. V 2) has a realization probability of α (resp. 1− α). The problem
consists in finding a product assortment S ⊆ [N ] maximizing the expected revenue ΠLogit, i.e.,
ΠLogit = max
S⊆[N ]
α1
∑
i∈S riV
1
i
1 +
∑
i∈S V
1
i
+ (1− α)
∑
i∈S riV
2
i
1 +
∑
i∈S V
2
i
.
The proof shows that, if there exists an oracle to compute the performance ranking for the MMNL
with two classes of consumers (i.e., Equation (2) with K = 2), then the 2-Class logit problem can
be solved in polynomial time.
Given an instance of the 2-Class Logit problem, the idea is to create N different instances of
the performance-ranking problem in order to capture the various possible assortments. The N
instances have a common core. Each of them has the same N items and two classes of consumers
(i.e., K = 2). For each consumer class j ∈ {0, 1} and each item i ∈ [N ], we set the appeal of item i
for class j to satisfy ai,j = V
j
i . Similarly, for each consumer class j ∈ {0, 1} and each item i ∈ [N ],
we set the quality of i for class j to satisfy qi,j = ri. Note that the quality of item i is the same for
both classes. The weights of classes 0 and 1 are α and 1 − α respectively. We also set z = 1 and
t = 0 which implies that dt = 0. The N instances differ in the position visibilities. In instance i
(i ∈ [N ]), the visibility of position j ∈ [N ] is:
vj =
{
1 if j ≤ i
0 otherwise.
Let ΠPRi denote the optimal value of the performance ranking for problem instance i and let Si
denote the collection of all possible subsets of products whose size is i, i.e., Si = {S ⊆ [N ] : |S| = i}.
Define ΠLogiti as the following optimization problem:
ΠLogiti = max
S∈Si
α1
∑
i∈S riV
1
i
1 +
∑
i∈S V
1
i
+ (1− α)
∑
i∈S riV
2
i
1 +
∑
i∈S V
2
i
.
It follows that
ΠLogit = max
i=1,...,N
ΠLogiti . (16)
We now show that ΠPRi is equal to Π
Logit
i .
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ΠPRi = max
σ∈Sn
{ 2∑
c=1
(
wc ·
N∑
`=1
(pi(σ, 0) · q`,c)
)}
, (17)
= max
σ∈Sn
{ 2∑
c=1
(
wc ·
N∑
`=1
( vσ(`)(a`,k)∑N
j=1 vσ(j)(aj,c) + 1
· q`,k
))}
. (18)
= max
σ∈Sn
{
α ·
N∑
`=1
( vσ(`)V 1` r`∑N
j=1 vσ(j)V
1
j + 1
)
+ (1− α) ·
N∑
`=1
( vσ(`)V 2` r`∑N
j=1 vσ(j)V
2
j + 1
)}
(19)
= max
S∈Si
{
α ·
∑
`∈S
( V 1` r`∑
j∈S V
1
j + 1
)
+ (1− α) ·
∑
`∈S
( V 2` r`∑
j∈S V
2
j + 1
)}
(20)
=ΠLogiti (21)
where the equivalence between (19) and (20) follows from the fact that the first i positions have
visibility of 1 and the remaining ones have a visibility of 0 and therefore selecting a permutation
σ ∈ Sn reduces to deciding which i items should be assigned the top i positions. As a consequence,
using (16), we have
ΠLogit = max
i=1,...,N
ΠLogiti (22)
= max
i=1,...,N
ΠPRi . (23)
We have shown that, by using an oracle to solve N instances of the performance-ranking problem,
it is possible to solve the original 2-class logit problem instance in polynomial time. Hence, the
performance ranking is NP-hard under Turing reductions.
Proof of Lemma 1. The market share of item i∗ at any period of time t > tˆ for this system would
be underestimated by considering the following set of qualities and appeals:
qi,new
{
qi,min if i = i
∗
qi,max if i 6= i∗ and ai,new
{
ai,min if i = i
∗
ai,max if i 6= i∗ .
If this new set of qualities satisfies that vσ(i∗)qi∗,new > vσ(i)qi,new for all i ∈ [N ] \ {i∗}, it follows
from the convergence result in [13] (Theorem 4.3) that the system goes to a monopoly for item i∗.
Therefore, the original system also goes to a monopoly for item i∗.
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof first shows that the MMNL model can be reduced to a Multinomial
Logic Model whose item appeals and qualities are functions of the vector of purchases at each time
t. It then shows that these functions stay in the bounded range, so that it is possible to apply
Lemma 1.
When the same ranking σ and popularity signals are shown to all consumers, the probability
that item i is downloaded in time period t is given by
Pi(σ, d
t) =
K∑
k=1
(
wk ·
(
vσ(i)
(ai,k + d
t
i)∑N
j=1 vσ(j)(aj,k + d
t
j) + z
· qi,k
))
. (24)
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By rearranging the previous expression, it comes
Pi(σ, d
t) =
K∑
k=1
wkqi,kvσ(i)∑N
j=1 vσ(j)(aj,k + d
t
j) + z
ai,k +
K∑
k=1
wk qi,kvσ(i)∑N
j=1 vσ(j)(aj,k + d
t
j) + z
dti
=
K∑
k=1
wkqi,kvσ(i)∑N
j=1 vσ(j)(aj,k + d
t
j) + z
ai,k + d
t
i
(
K∑
k=1
wk qi,kvσ(i)∑N
j=1 vσ(j)(aj,k + d
t
j) + z
)
=
(
K∑
k=1
wk qi,kvσ(i)∑N
j=1 vσ(j)(aj,k + d
t
j) + z
)
(∑K
k=1
wkqi,kvσ(i)∑N
j=1 vσ(j)(aj,k+d
t
j)+z
ai,k
)
(∑K
k=1
wkqi,kvσ(i)∑N
j=1 vσ(j)(aj,k+d
t
j)+z
) + dti

=
(
K∑
k=1
wk qi,kvσ(i)∑N
j=1 vσ(j)(aj,k + d
t
j) + z
)vσ(i)
(∑K
k=1
wkqi,kai,k∑N
j=1 vσ(j)(aj,k+d
t
j)+z
)
vσ(i)
(∑K
k=1
wkqi,k∑N
j=1 vσ(j)(aj,k+d
t
j)+z
) + dti

=
(
K∑
k=1
wk qi,kvσ(i)∑N
j=1 vσ(j)(aj,k + d
t
j) + z
)
(∑K
k=1
wkqi,kai,k∑N
j=1 vσ(j)(aj,k+d
t
j)+z
)
(∑K
k=1
wkqi,k∑N
j=1 vσ(j)(aj,k+d
t
j)+z
) + dti
 .
Now, for each item i and each time period t, define the function
a˜i(t) =
(∑K
k=1
wkqi,kai,k∑N
j=1 vσ(j)(aj,k+d
t
j)+z
)
(∑K
k=1
wkqi,k∑N
j=1 vσ(j)(aj,k+d
t
j)+z
) (25)
which depends on the total number of purchases at time t. Using this definition, we have that:
Pi(σ, d
t) =
(
K∑
k=1
wk qi,kvσ(i)∑N
j=1 vσ(j)(aj,k + d
t
j) + z
)(
a˜i(t) + d
t
i
)
=
(
K∑
k=1
wk qi,k∑N
j=1 vσ(j)(aj,k + d
t
j) + z
)
vσ(i)
(
a˜i(t) + d
t
i
)
.
By dividing and multiplying by
∑N
j=1 vσ(j)(a˜j(t) + d
t
j) + z, Pi(σ, d
t) becomes
(
K∑
k=1
wk qi,k∑N
j=1 vσ(j)(aj,k + d
t
j) + z
) N∑
j=1
vσ(j)(a˜j(t) + d
t
j) + z
( vσ(i) (a˜i(t) + dti)∑N
j=1 vσ(j)(a˜j(t) + d
t
j) + z
)
.
Now define the following function for each item i at each time period t:
q˜i(t) =
(
K∑
k=1
wk qi,k∑N
j=1 vσ(j)(aj,k + d
t
j) + z
) N∑
j=1
vσ(j)(a˜j(t) + d
t
j) + z
 . (26)
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The probability of purchasing product i in the next iteration becomes:
Pi(σ, d
t) =
(
vσ(i)(a˜i(t) + d
t
i)∑N
j=1 vσ(j)(a˜j(t) + d
t
j) + z
)
q˜i(t).
This is almost a multinomial logit model, except that the quality and appeal vectors that depend
on time. When the number of iterations t tends to infinity, the total number of purchases
∑N
j=1 d
t
j
also goes to infinity. Moreover, as t goes to infinity, the generalized appeal (a˜i(t)) and quality (q˜i(t))
for every item converges to
a¯i
.
= lim
t→∞ a˜i(t) =
∑K
k=1wkai,kqi,k∑K
k=1wkqi,k
and q¯i
.
= lim
t→∞ q˜i(t) =
K∑
k=1
wkqi,k.
In addition, observe that Q˜i(t)
.
= vσ(i)q˜i(t) also converges when t goes to infinity:
Q¯i
.
= lim
t→∞ vσ(i)q˜i(t) = vσ(i)q¯i
The tie-breaking condition (Equation 6) guarantees that there exists only one item i∗ such that
i∗ = argmaxi∈[N ] Q¯i. Let i∗∗ be the item with the second highest value Q¯i, i.e., Q¯i∗∗ ≥ Q¯j for all
j ∈ [N ], j 6= i∗. Consider now the following difference ∆Q¯ = Q¯i∗ − Q¯i∗∗ . Equation (25) can be seen
as a weighted average on k for ai,k and hence
min
1≤k≤K
ai,k ≤ a˜i(t) ≤ max
1≤k≤K
ai,k ∀i ∈ [N ], t ∈ N (27)
Moreover, by applying this result to Equation (26), we obtain the following bounds for q˜i:
q˜i(t) ≥
K∑
k=1
wkqi,k∑N
j=1 vσ(j)(max1≤k≤K ai,k + d
t
j) + z
 N∑
j=1
vσ(j)(− max
1≤k≤K
ai,k + max
1≤k≤K
ai,k + d
t
j) + z

=
K∑
k=1
wkqi,k
(∑N
j=1 vσ(j)(max1≤k≤K ai,k + d
t
j) + z
)
− wkqi,k max1≤k≤K ai,k∑N
j=1 vσ(j)(max1≤k≤K ai,k + d
t
j) + z
=
(
1−
∑N
j=1 vσ(j) max1≤k≤K aj,k∑N
j=1 vσ(j)d
t
j + z
)
q¯i.
Since z ≥ 0, we have that (∀i ∈ [1, N ], t ∈ N)
q˜i(t) ≥
(
1−
∑N
j=1 vσ(j) max1≤k≤K aj,k∑N
j=1 vσ(j)d
t
j
)
q¯i
q˜i(t) ≤
K∑
k=1
wkqi,k∑N
j=1 vσ(j)d
t
j + z
 N∑
j=1
vσ(j)( max
1≤k≤K
ai,k + d
t
j) + z

≤
(
1 +
∑N
j=1 vσ(j) max1≤k≤K aj,k∑N
j=1 vσ(j)d
t
j
)
q¯i.
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As a result, the bounds for Q˜i(t) (∀i ∈ [1, N ], t ∈ N) are given by
Q˜i(t) ≥
(
1−
∑N
j=1 vσ(j) max1≤k≤K aj,k∑N
j=1 vσ(j)d
t
j
)
Q¯i
Q˜i(t) ≤
(
1 +
∑N
j=1 vσ(j) max1≤k≤K aj,k∑N
j=1 vσ(j)d
t
j
)
Q¯i.
To conclude the proof, we need to estimate the total number of purchases dˆtot that guarantees that
∀t > t∗ : Q˜i∗(t) > Q˜i∗∗(t)
where t∗ is the time period in which the total number of purchases becomes dˆtot =
∑
i∈[N ] d
t∗
i . The
value dˆtot and its associated vector of purchases d
t∗ must satisfy the following condition
∆Q¯ >
∑N
j=1 vσ(j) max1≤k≤K aj,k∑N
j=1 vσ(j)d
t∗
j
(Q¯i∗ + Q¯i∗∗). (28)
To verify inequality (28), it suffices to choose dˆtot to satisfy So with the following condition we
guarantee the validity of equation
dˆtot >
maxj vσ(j)
minj vσ(j)
∑N
j=1 max1≤k≤K aj,k
∆Q¯
(Q¯i∗ + Q¯i∗∗). (29)
We can now apply Lemma 1 using ranking policy σ to prove that the model goes to a monopoly
for item i∗, which maximizes the product of its visibility and its weighted average quality, i.e.,
vσ(i)q¯i.
Proof of Corollary 1. From Theorem (2), a MMNL model goes to a monopoly for the item i that
maximizes vσ(i)q¯i. When the quality ranking is used, the product i
∗ that goes to a monopoly is
i∗ = argmax
i
vσ(i)q¯i = argmax
i
(q¯i) = q¯1.
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